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Introduction
Since 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been open to states for signature with a goal of ending all nuclear testing. While it has had moderate success, several key states have not yet ratified it and brought it into force. To date, 181 countries have signed the treaty and 149 have ratified it, with ratification being the sticking point with China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States. If President Barack Obama's administration follows through with its stated goal of ratifying the CTBT, what are the pros, cons for us national security, and specifically what are the associated impacts on the U.S. nuclear stockpile, its deterrence capabilities, and global nuclear arms control?
The Comprehensive Test Ban should be ratified if three conditions are satisfied if is determined that:
• The US nuclear weapons stockpile can be reliably maintained without farther nuclear explosive test;
• The US extended deterrent to the 31 allied States that depend on it for their security is not harmed by a lack of testing;
• Treaty compliance by the signatory states can be adequately verified.
It is also important to understand that the CTBT is limited instrument that can aid US nonproliferation efforts but cannot stop determined proliferation since some states may choose not to sign, ratify and/or comply with its terms. Other measures will be required to cope with such threats in addition to treaties. Before arguing this, it is useful to first review the CTBT history, structure and current status will be reviewed to form a working foundation. Second, the United State's CTBT role and ratification efforts will be examined through President George H.W. Bush's, President Bill Clinton's, President George W.
Bush's and President Barack Obama's administrations. Third, the essay will examine the pros of United States CTBT ratification pertaining to nuclear arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the CTBT monitoring and inspection network. To conclude, the cons of United States CTBT ratification will be evaluated with emphasis on the nuclear weapon Stockpile Stewardship Program, Life Extension Programs, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, and United States deterrence and nuclear proliferation impacts.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The main goal of the CTBT is to outlaw global atmospheric, surface, underwater and underground nuclear testing. Through denial of nuclear testing, the treaty's intent is to obstruct initial development of nuclear weapons by states that don't have them, to thwart states that have nuclear weapons from designing new variants, to prevent public health issues and to stop [3] environmental damage. The primary task of the CTBTO is to promote the treaty in order to get states to sign it, ratify it, and thereby bring the treaty into force. Once the treaty is in force, the body will formally become the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization comprised of 3 Daryl G. Kimball, "Learning from the 1999 Vote on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," (Oct. 5, 2009), www.armscontrol.org. 4 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "CTBTO Fact Sheet," (Oct. 3, 2009) , www.ctbto.org.
[4] a Conference of State Parties, a Technical Secretariat, and an Executive Council responsible for implementing the CTBT's requirements and international verification measures.
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Current Status
As previously stated, the CTBTO is currently a preparatory body because the treaty itself has yet to come into force. The reason behind the 13-year-plus gap between September 1996 and December 2009 is due to several key states either not signing the treaty, or failing to ratify it.
Signing the treaty is the first step, with ratification (a state's formal government approval) occurring next. There are 195 states the CTBTO currently tracks, and 182 of those have signed (13 have not), 151 have ratified (44 have not), and those 13 that haven't signed the treaty are also ones that haven't ratified it. When the CTBT opened for signature, 44 states were listed as having the technological means for nuclear reactors or nuclear research reactors, and it is these states that must sign and ratify the CTBT for it to become enforceable. Those states are referred as CTBT Annex 2 States (see figure 1).
[5] [9]
The next two highest programmed contributing states are Japan ($9. [10]
their ratification examples. Pro-CTBT individuals feel the delay in bringing the treaty into force has not allowed the world the full security benefits the treaty affords. While the politics of who should sign the CTBT first has existed for more than 13 years, a wider perspective of the remaining nine states warrants discussion.
Impact on Nuclear Arms Control
The and depending on the number of s warheads and delivery vehicles allowed by the terms, the CTBT becomes an integral part in future nuclear-arms discussions.
In the end, [12]
The United States is also working toward a treaty to reduce the fissile materials, plutonium and uranium, required to produce nuclear weapons. This treaty, called the Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty, will fall under the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, and is considered vital because "as nuclear arsenals come down, it will be increasingly important to have limitations on fissile material that could be used to produce new weapons."
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Also at the May 2010 United Nations meetings will be a review of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), which is held every five years. The synergy between the START
follow-on negotiations, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, NPT and CTBT is crucial for President
Obama's administration because he has the unique opportunity to link long-term nuclear policies. Since these nuclear treaties are being discussed/negotiated at roughly the same time, his priority is likely to reduce warheads via the START follow-on treaty, and then use that as a foundation to show strengthened United States resolve for reducing nuclear capabilities at the NPT review (and to give the United States credibility and leverage for keeping states desiring nuclear capabilities in the NPT regime).
Currently, the Committee on Disarmament agreed on Aug. 11, 1998, to create a committee to negotiate the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, with further discussions scheduled at the May 2010 NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons conference in New York.
Figure 2. Nuclear Weapon Test Sites
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At the core of the CTBT is the positive belief that by banning nuclear testing, established nuclear states will be limited in their ability to create new and, or more sophisticated nuclear weapons. This essentially attempts to prevent an arms race where one country competes with another country's newer designs, capabilities, and stockpile quantities. The CTBT also takes aim at those states with no nuclear weapons by making it much more difficult for them to go through the same technological development cycle. With nuclear testing, states like the United States and the former Soviet Union were able to detect nuclear design problems, incorporate changes, test the new weapon, and then add to its stockpile. Figure 2 shows displays where the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries performed these tests.
22 CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Nuclear Weapon Test Sites," (Oct. 3, 2009), www.ctbto.org.
[14]
Link to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was created in 1968 among the five states with nuclear capabilities (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) and entered into force in 1970. The purpose was to ban NPT members from transferring or aiding other countries to obtain nuclear weapons. It also committed those five states to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Currently 189 states are members of the NPT, and the CTBT links to it through these three key articles. 23 Article I: each NPT nuclear weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons, or nuclear explosive devices, and to not assist non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons. Article IV: parties to the treaty have the right to pursue research and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article VI: NPT states will pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
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Impact on Nuclear Proliferation
There are 189 NPT member states. Unfortunately, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan are not NPT members. Instead, they have joined the ranks of nuclear weapon states. North Korea is an exception to the rule. It joined the NPT in 1985, but withdrew in 2003.
Many believe that historically, more countries would have acquired nuclear capabilities had the NPT not been negotiated and served as a legal barrier to proliferation. But after the 1991 Gulf War when Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program was discovered, this served as a clear example of a nuclear power program being used as a cover for a nuclear weapons program.
[15]
Cheating on the treaty limits allowed Iraq to covertly develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously enjoying the nuclear power program benefits provided by NPT membership. This same path to a nuclear weapons program was followed by North Korea and, now, Iran.
Libya was in the process of acquiring a turn-key nuclear program, but abandoned it, and more recently Iran was caught with nuclear enriching facilities not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (and therefore not previously open to inspection). These cases of NPT violations and clandestine proliferation programs by Iran Iraq, and Libya show the difficulty of treaty verification the CTBTO must also address how to verify member compliance in order to enforce the CTBT. 25 When the U.S. Senate voted against ratifying the CTBT in 1999, a limiting factor in the eyes of anti-CTBT United States Senators was the perceived inability to accurately monitor and verify the world for nuclear tests. That was highly debatable 13 years ago, but today the CTBTO's verification system is more robust due to modernization and and augmentation of the system as shown for example, by its success in monitoring the North Korean nuclear tests.
CTBT Monitoring and Inspection Network
In order to detect a nuclear test, the CTBTO will depend on an International Monitoring System which consists of 337 global facilities (see Figure 3 ). Of these 337 sites, 249 are System is composed of four parts to detect a nuclear explosion: seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide.
Figure 3. CTBTO International Monitoring System Sites
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These stations are able to detect a nuclear explosion as small as one-tenth of a kiloton (200,000 lbs) 27 and of note, China has yet to allow International Monitoring Stations on its border to transmit data to the International Data Centre.
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The seismic portion has 170 sites, 50 primary and 120 auxiliary, to monitor and detect shockwaves below the Earth's surface. [18] enters into force.
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Cons of U.S. CTBT Ratification
While ratification of the CTBT by the Annex 2 states, and entry into force would be a positive step toward a nuclear weapon free world, there are drawbacks.
From the U.S. perspective, the lack of nuclear testing since 1996 has left an aging nuclear stockpile. Some nuclear weapons lack the most current safety features, and the downturn of the nuclear infrastructure technical knowledge required to maintain it goes directly against our goal of having safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons. Established in 1998 by the National Defense Act, the Stockpile Stewardship Program was created in order to deal with an aging stockpile without nuclear testing.
Stockpile Stewardship Program
The Stockpile Stewardship Program "is the implementing strategy of the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure a credible United States nuclear deterrent without underground testing." In the past, testing and constantly upgrading the nuclear stockpile gave a high-level of confidence to the United States and its allies. Since that is no longer the case, and the United States has not fielded a new nuclear weapon since the early 1990s, the Stockpile Stewardship Program strives to use a science-based approach with advance simulation and modeling tools as a substitute for actual nuclear weapons testing. The biggest doubt raised among the nuclear community scientists responsible for the weapons design is the lack of empirical test data. The hopes are that new capabilities will arrive, allowing scientific simulations to be more accurate than actual underground testing. That time has not come, so Life Extension Programs are how www.ctbto.org. 32 Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Matters -A Practical Guide, Washington D.C., p 51.
[19]
the United States presently deals with an aging Cold War nuclear stockpile at the core of its retaliatory capability that hopefully creates substantial deterrent effects.
Life Extension Programs
With the end of the Cold War and the self-imposed ban on nuclear testing in 1992, the United States outlook on world affairs was much different than it is today. Since then India, North
Korea and Pakistan have all tested nuclear weapons (and have not signed the CTBT); China, 
Reliable Replacement Warhead
The Reliable Replacement Warhead effort has taken many turns and was cancelled in 2009. [20]
safer and more reliable warhead design as part of a broader effort to modernize and maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent."
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A new warhead, which has already shown to be very politically sensitive, will also come at the price of obtaining a much needed upgrade to our nuclear deterrent without actual testing.
John Foster, a veteran Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory nuclear weapons specialist, states, "If the labs are not permitted to practice design, then the development of any warhead can't assume competence and proficiency, and a credible deterrent cannot be maintained."
The Reliable Replacement Warhead (or a similar program under a different title) is a positive step toward modernizing the stockpile, and is an essential offset to ratifying the CTBT.
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Impact on United States Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation
While Foster's opinion may not reflect an official Department of Energy position, it does underscore the associated risk of fielding a new critical nuclear capability without actually physically testing its reliability.
The goal of deterrence is to have a credible and visible means to alter an adversary's behavior. [21]
A.Q. Khan's black market illegal nuclear proliferation operation proved extremely detrimental to the attempt to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons and showed how a non-nuclear state can relatively quickly and easily obtain all the parts necessary to become a nuclear weapon state.
Iran acquired significant nuclear weapons technology through the A.Q. Khan network, including enrichment capabilities for nuclear weapons material designs, and the nuclear technology for both gun-type and implosion-type weapons. Iran has also concentrated on configuring nuclear warheads for use on medium-range missiles, and, as the world recently discovered, has several dispersed facilities capable of enriching uranium. [22]
like these from creating nuclear weapons is to extend a nuclear deterrence "umbrella" to them in exchange for abandoning nuclear weapons programs. The United States needs a safe, and secure and nuclear retaliatory force marked by nuclear stockpile that is reliable and perceived to be reliable in order to deter potential adversaries.
Other [23]
Conclusion
Distressing nuclear proliferation has occurred despite International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations efforts. States willing to covertly develop and test nuclear weapons, despite their treaties obligations and world-opinion, have continued without severe consequences.
Treaties like the CTBT are necessary but not sufficient nonproliferation elements. They must be accompanied by other measures to make sense.
Since 1996, the CTBT has successfully curtailed nuclear tests of all but four of the CTBT signatory states have curtailed their nuclear tests. What the CTBT has not done, and may not do, is convince states like Iran and North Korea to join the regime and to stop nuclear weapon development and testing. If President Obama's administration is able to accomplish its goal of ratifying the CTBT, it would be a huge accomplishment and will provide international legal barriers to nuclear testing. US ratification also should add pressure to other states like China that is still unsure about a commitment to ban nuclear tests without a similar pledge by the United States.. While politically and diplomatically significant, ratification of the CTBT without additional measures could increase United States security risks in a number of key critical areas.
First, security and reliability concerns continue to rise with aging nuclear warheads and weapons. The lack of actual testing is only mitigated, not eliminated, by the Stockpile Stewardship and Life Extension Programs. We are at a crossroads where we will have to rely on computer designs and modeling in order to establish an acceptable level of confidence regarding current and future nuclear weapons if we ratify the CTBT. If an issue arises with the United
States stockpile, and we determine testing is required to maintain an effective and credible [24] deterrent, the value of the CTBT could be erased, opening the door for other states to do the same.
Second, the combined impact from the previous risks has states like Egypt, Japan, South
Korea and Turkey reviewing again whether they need their own nuclear weapons. If the United
States nuclear stockpile is in question, or nuclear proliferation cannot be stopped to their satisfaction, these sovereign states may feel the extended deterrence provided by the United
States is no longer adequate.
Third, the CTBT verification regime must be able to detect cheating by member states.
Fortunately, the multiplicity of seismic solution that now surrounds the globe appears able to detect nuclear test explosions with a great deal of fidelity While a new warhead for the United States would address the first security risk, the others will not be solved by the CTBT and its supporting organization alone. The CTBT, if augmented by a reliable Stockpile program, a sound extended deterrent to dissuade our non-nuclear allies form going nuclear, and a continued robust verification program is an asset to US security and, therefore, should be ratified by the US Senate. As the first to test and use nuclear weapons, the United States has the obligation to lead the world toward a safer and more secure environment regarding nuclear weapons. The comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will put legal limits on testing, and a test ban will be an added inhibitor of development of additional or new types of nuclear weapons. For those reasons the CTBT, given certain conditions, is in the US national interest and deserves ratification by the US Senate.
